(Draft of my essay submitted for EH401)
This essay summarizes the argument in R.C. Allen’s, “Why the Industrial
Revolution was British” about how relative factor prices influenced the early
onset of Industrial Revolution in Britain, and takes a critical look at the thesis.
The “Industrial revolution” refers
to the historic increase in the productivity and income levels of a number of
economies in the world--starting with Europe and North America initially—in the
fields of industry, agriculture, transport services, technology etc., from the early
decades of the 18th century and extending well into the latter half
of the 19th century. The period of onset of the industrial
revolution, however, varied in different countries: with Great Britain being
the first to witness these revolutionary changes followed by other countries in
western Europe and the European offshoots (North America), before the benefits
of industrialization spread to the entire globe. Although the countries (that
underwent the industrial revolution in the 18th and the 19th
centuries) possessed strong institutions that fostered increased capital
accumulation and technology (both of which were important contributors to
increase in productivity and income), all of them did not witness simultaneous
growth in income levels, or witness any kind of industrialized growth phase
that directly followed as a result of the establishment of stable institutions.
For instance, the Dutch economy failed to tread a path of technological and
industrialized growth even under the persistence of stable institutions.
Why did countries that possessed
a strong institutional setup, like in Britain, fail to replicate the successful
performance of Britain? In other words, why was the Industrial revolution, at
least initially, a British phenomenon? The spread of industry and technology
was not a simultaneous process that spanned across Europe. While the British
economy was witnessing growth of new industries and technological innovations
(like the steam engine, for instance, that tremendously cut down the cost of
transport), the whole of continental Europe was still predominantly an
agricultural society. The underlying cause for the disparity in the structure
and income of the British and continental European economies can be explained
by taking into account the peculiar factor prices that existed in Britain, and
that which was absent in continental Europe. Labour wages and energy prices in
Britain influenced entrepreneurs to make certain decisions that spurred
industrialization and technological development. The absence of such unique
factor prices eventually made the difference between the success of Britain and
failure of continental Europe.
Wages in Britain were
considerably higher than what prevailed in other European countries, and the
rest of the world. It was not just the nominal wages that were high in Britain,
but also real wages (this can be seen in the welfare ratio figures). Apart from
high wages, the other peculiar feature of the British economy was the low price
of energy sources that could be used as capital in production. Also witness to
this are figures on the price of wages relative to energy prices was highest in
Britain (Allen, 2011). The presence of high wages and low energy prices
provided the right mix of incentives for British entrepreneurs to find ways to
cut down their outlay on labour and substitute labour with capital resources that
were very cheap compared to labour. This naturally led entrepreneurs to invest
in industrial technologies that could make use of cheap energy resources,
instead of persisting with old technologies that required the use of expensive
labour. The new demand for labour-saving technologies coupled with the patent
system spurred the invention of new technologies – a particular feature that
characterizes the industrial revolution in general.
Although the Allen’s thesis that outlines
the factors that led to industrial revolution in Britain-- through the
replacement of expensive labour with cheap capital-intensive technologies--those
factors that are mentioned to be unique to the British case are not necessarily
so unique in satisfying the requirements of capital-intensive development (that
industrial revolution calls for) as such. In other words, the existence of a
particular pattern of relative prices in the form of high wages and low energy
costs (that is unique to the British case) is not a necessary precondition for productivity-enhancing
technology to be invented and subsequently adopted. In the 20th
century, the experience of improvement in agricultural productivity in
countries like the United States and Japan show the role played by relative factor
prices in determining the quality of the technological inventions that result.
Japan, which had relatively little amount of land (and hence higher land
prices) compared to its endowment of labour invested in resource-saving
‘biological innovations’ that increased the yield of land; while United States,
which had relatively little amount of labour (and hence higher wages) compared
to its land endowments invested in labour-saving ‘mechanical innovations’ that increased
the productivity of labour.
While relative factor prices can
influence the incentives of entrepreneurs in adopting either labour-saving or
resource-saving technologies, it does not influence the motives of
entrepreneurs to invest in technology itself. The motive to invest in
technology (of either type) is independent of relative factor prices; although
the kind of investment (labour-saving or resource-saving) depends on the
relative factor prices. If so be the case, there is no reason to believe that
relative factor prices were decisive in Britain’s technological development.
Entrepreneurs who want to cut down on the cost of production of goods, as such,
do not care whether their cost-cutting measures economize on labour or resource
outlays. While there lies a tendency for entrepreneurs to concentrate primarily
on economizing factors of production that contribute most to the cost of
production, this does not however mean that disparity in factor prices
necessarily hastens the process of invention of new technology itself. That
being said, there is definitely an incentive for entrepreneurs to economize on production
costs of goods that involve high cost of production, irrespective of the
respective factor prices. If so be the case, there is no reason not to believe
that high energy costs in continental Europe shouldn’t have spurred
entrepreneurs to invest in developing resource-saving technology.
The high energy costs in
continental Europe should have spurred the same kind of technological
innovation-spree, but of a different quality (resource-saving in the case of
continental Europe, rather than labour-saving), that characterized
industrialization in Britain. The case of 20th century Japanese
agriculture stands testimony to the fact that an economy could be steered along
the path of resource-saving technology when factor prices favour such a path.
The conditions in 18th century continental Europe also suggest that
investing in resource-saving technologies would have been highly profitable for
entrepreneurs. For instance, cost of energy in France was six times high as
much in Britain (Allen,2009). The fact that continental Europe did not move on
the path towards resource-saving technology probably suggests that there must
have been other qualitative differences in the economic environment of Britain
and continental Europe, which needs to be explored further.